A report by the Government Accountability Office has
revealed that a $2 billion radiation monitor being tested by the Department of
Homeland Security not only yields little benefit for the American public, but
that DHS has not even tested the equipment properly.
The equipment, known as advanced spectroscopic portal
radiation (ASP for short, somehow), is designed to help Customs and Border Protection detect smugglers importing nuclear material into the United States. However,
tests have shown that the new technology does not significantly improve Customs
and Border Protection’s nuclear detection efficiency – certainly not to the tune of
$822,000
per machine.
Preliminary testing showed that ASP performed well: it surpassed the current system in its ability to
detect radiation and prevent false alarms that hinder commercial activity. (The current system is known as PVT, for polyvinyl tolulene, if you're scoring at home.) So far, so good. But GAO claims
that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the Homeland
Security office whose mission is fairly self-evident from its name, didn’t bother using the proper
data.
In fact, the whole testing process was flawed from the
start. At the start of experiments, DNDO allowed contractors to involve
themselves in the testing process. Although these contractors were removed at
GAO’s insistence, there still appeared to be a bias towards the radiation detector
in DNDO tests. In comparing the ASP to PVT, Homeland Security neglected to use
data from an improved version of PVT, which overstated the difference between
the two.
DNDO had the improved PVT data in its possession, but chose
to not analyze it. (Funny, and apt, that its acronym resembles “Didn’t Do.”)
“Part of the problem with this whole thing is that they’ve
been moving forward with acquisition before all the testing has been complete,”
said Gene Aloise, director of natural resources and environment at the GAO. Existing
technology could be improved upon before making the decision to acquire more.
Still, the Didn’t Do agency pressed forward with trying to
implement ASP, even though their research lacked integrity. Like in any
laboratory setting, DNDO was limited by the amount of real world situations they
could test. To compensate for this, injection studies — computer programs that,
in this case, simulate a large sample of materials coming into port — are
typically used.
But with their eyes firmly on the prize, DNDO refused to
conduct these stress tests until DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano certifies the
implementation of ASP (which should happen on Opposites Day).
To add fuel to the fire, delays in figuring out how ASP
could be integrated into existing security infrastructure (yet another reason to
not implement the new technology) gave DNDO ample time to conduct these
injection studies. They still decided against it.
The problems in figuring out how to move ASP from the lab to
the field and the disdain for additional research illustrates the situation
perfectly — DNDO wants Congress to sign off on the project, approved during the
Bush administration, as soon as possible. This careless attitude has left many
people frustrated.
“Bottom line: this is still an R and D program that has been
prematurely turned into an acquisition program,” Gene Aloise lamented. “They
shouldn’t proceed until all testing is done.”
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