In
his policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama, has yet to
address the issue of private military contractors. He railed
against them during his campaign, yet made no proposal to do away
with them. But with his plans to change troop levels in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, the public has a right to know what role armed contractors
will play in his strategy.
Despite many well documented
problems, President Obama has given no indication that he plans on downsizing
their role. And many are asking the appropriate: Why not? Just what are their redeeming qualities?
A question of efficiency
The
case for privatization is primarily based on the theory that profit-seekers
can manage organizations more efficiently than the government. But a glance at the salaries of private security guards in Iraq seems
to relegate this theory to the pile of doctrines that work on paper
only. In 2004, for example, the average Blackwater guard made $600 per day -- over $100 a day more than the commander of the entire war, General Petreus. Meanwhile, Army sergeants made about $85 per day.
Of course, there's two sides to every story, and according to Major John Redfield,
spokesman for Central Command, those numbers don't tell the whole tale.
“It's
certainly accurate that military wages on the whole, and especially
wages for those in the lower ranks of the military, are lower than the
wages paid to contractors,” Maj. Redfield told OhMyGov!. “However,
don't overlook other cost factors involved.” (Benefit costs are
one of those factors.) “While the military provides medical and
dental care to its members, as well as retirement pay for those who
qualify, the company that accepts a government contract would be responsible
for those costs to its employees.”
Maj.
Redfield went on to explain the benefit of hiring trained soldiers to the
Department of Defense budget.
“The military pays the training
costs for its troops, whereas the government would expect contractors
to come into their jobs ready to work from day one.”
Clinton verbiage aside, Maj. Redfield conceded that the economic efficiency argument is far
from watertight.
“I'm not implying that adding training and
entitlement costs to military wages will bring overall compensation
up to the level of contractor compensation," said Redfield. "I'm just saying I
think those costs need to be factored in for the most accurate comparison
possible.”
Yet
other aspects of entitlement and training costs must also be considered
when calculating the true cost of hiring private soldiers. Though private
security guards may be “ready to work from day one," many of
those who served the American armed forces become private security contractors. Thus,
taxpayers not only paid for their training, but also for the high wages
paid to them by the Pentagon for being highly trained...by the Pentagon.
The issue of entitlement costs is also complicated. When in
need of medical attention, contractors typically receive it at American
military bases, putting an additional strain on the armed forces'
medical staff physically and financially. A recent
federal report revealed that the Department of Defense has failed
to seek reimbursement from the private insurers that cover private security forces when treating contractors. And
if that doesn't grind your gears enough, the insurer who owes the government
the most for this treatment is AIG -- an $85 billion Congressional bailout recipient that has essentially monopolized
the insurance market for contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So even if the Department of Defense did get reimbursement from AIG,
it would essentially be tax dollars coming full circle.
What about Flexibility?
Those who support private military contractors
contend that they provide the government with flexibility. Contractors
are not burdened by all the pesky rules and regulations that the military
faces. There is, however, a much darker side to this benefit,
according to Peter Singer, Brookings Institute scholar and military
expert.
Flexibility,
says Singer, means that our leaders can make policy without worrying
about politics. They can effectively escalate a war while simultaneously
sidestepping political accountability. This is exactly what the
Bush Administration did in planning the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Needing too many troops would've been politically unwise for an administration
that partially based the case for war on the assumption that it would
be brief.
General
Eric Shinseki found this out the hard way – his appeal for more troops
in the build-up to war only earned him Donald Rumsfeld's wrath, and
ensured that the end of his decorated Army career was uncharacteristically
unceremonious. Rummy couldn't have anyone
suggesting the war might be difficult, even if the person suggesting
it was a four-star General.
Although
the Pentagon eventually pursued a policy similar to that recommended
by Gen. Shinseki, even official post-surge troop totals and casualty
numbers obscure the real size of the effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Singer pointed out, if contractors were accounted for in casualty
statistics, those statistics would be much higher. To date, almost
4,300 American troops have died in Iraq. In comparison, 1,123 contractors were reported to have been killed
at the end of 2008. And although not all of these contractors
killed were providing security, many of them were performing duties
that were once performed by members of the military.
Yet the death of contractors does not appear to garner the same amount of attention
as the casualties of servicemen and women. Maybe this is because
the public sympathizes more with someone who has sworn to fight out of patriotism and idealism, instead
of someone whose motive for fighting includes financial incentives - an interesting psychological phenomenon considering that the military is paid for their work, with danger pay added, and many contractors are former military officers.
Perhaps the blase attitude about contractor deaths stems partly from the fact that many contractors, including
those that are armed security personnel, are not American. At
the start of 2009, there were 148,050 contractors serving the American
government in Iraq, 8,701 of whom were armed security personnel, according
to the Department of Defense. Only 39,292 of those contractors were
American citizens, 727 of them acting as armed security guards. It seems then that the Pentagon has found a way to avoid the issue of mounting
casualties by outsourcing them to private companies and foreign nationals. And yet the deaths of private contractors still means widows, fatherless
children, anger and frustration.
An elite corporate fighting
force?
Flexibility,
in addition to hiding the true human cost of the war, also provides
American forces in Iraq with troops capable of adopting politically
unsavory tactics. Protecting those they were hired to guard is
the armed contractor's mission. And, according to one contractor,
“If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad.”
For whatever reason,
the Bush administration felt the need for this sort of force, and, until
2007, when the Uniform Code of Justice was amended to apply to defense
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, allowed them to act as they pleased.
This hard-nosed attitude has been appreciated by those who have been
protected by private contractors -- Blackwater boasted that it never
lost anyone it was hired to protect in Iraq, a fact that earned the
company praise from State Department officials. Furthermore, many armed contractors
are far more experienced than your run-of-the mill army privates, adding to the sense of security that officials and diplomats feel
when under their guard.
Some
State officials, however, are concerned that the us-against-them attitude
typical of private security contractors is not helping the battle to
win Iraqi hearts and minds. Yes, there are contractors who act
with high degrees of professionalism, but when some of them
run innocent Iraqis off the road and fire at them, the consequences
are far-reaching. These Iraqis tend to judge all American personnel
by the contractors' actions, despite the fact that American soldiers
don't tend to make these mistakes as often (or at least report them).
One
State Department official interviewed by Peter Singer noticed this difference
in attitude between contractors and soldiers, while being escorted around
Iraq. When soldiers were leading escort missions, they would make
the effort to befriend Iraqis they encountered. This attitude
simply was not displayed by contractors, who “focused only on the
contract."
Regardless
of one's opinion of these armed contractors, there is currently a dependency
on them and they will not be going away anytime soon. There are about 9,000 armed contractors in Iraq, comprising just under 10 percent of total
troop levels. Considering that these contractors provide a specialized
service -- the protection of diplomats, other officials and civilian
contractors -- they will be difficult to replace. But as President Obama considers a staged withdrawal from Iraq, he will be forced to confront
this issue of hired guns in the future.
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