In a classic case of lost and never found, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration forgot how to make an essential warhead component for one of the United States' main nuclear programs. The institutional brain fart cost millions of dollars and a year-long delay.
On February 23, 2009 the Security Administration disseminated a press release lauding the talents of the men and women who successfully refurbished and re-integrated the first W76 nuclear warhead into the U.S. nuclear weapons stock pile, a ten year effort. The warheads, which are used with Trident II submarine-launched missiles, make up a considerable portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
William Ostendorff, the National Nuclear Security Administration's principle deputy administrator, had this to say: "This is another great example of the unsurpassed expertise throughout NNSA's national security enterprise. It becomes more and more challenging each time we extend the life of our nuclear weapons."
But Ostendorff failed to mention that the project was a year behind, and rife with project management errors leading to $69 million in over-budget spending.
The Government Accountability Office recently released an un-classified version of a report (pdf) they delivered in January 2009. The report chastised the NNSA for its failure to follow its own protocol, provide management powers to its project manager, and to keep records or staff knowledgeable on the essential component codenamed "Fogbank."
The mysterious Fogbank "...is thought by some weapons experts to be a foam used between the fission and fusion stages of a thermonuclear bomb," reported the Glasgow Sunday Herald.
A Bit Foggy on Fogbank
Part of the Department of Energy, NNSA began implementing the Stock Pile Extension Program in 1996. The program was designed to extend the life span of U.S. nuclear armaments, already past their expected life spans, by 20 to 30 years. Meanwhile, the agency would consider proposals to develop safer and less expensive replacement warheads. In connection with those responsibilities, the agency was asked to administer critical repairs to the W76 warhead in 2000.
The W76 warheads were discovered to need the replacement of Fogbank early in the revitalization process. In planning to do this the agency designed and set into practice a detailed system whereby Fogbank could be manufactured and the warheads delivered to the Navy beginning in September 2007. The Navy in return would then replace both currently deployed pieces and those in storage.
The plan had three elements: The first was to rebuild a factory for the development and production of Fogbank at the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This was to be done in a manner that would allow for time to resolve any manufacturing problems. Second was to use a pilot plant to test the process used to make Fogbank while the new facility was being built. The final part was to consider developing an "alternate material for Fogbank that was easier to produce." Bureaucratic hubris ensued.
The GAO commented that the "risk management strategy" was not effectively implemented. In developing the manufacturing plant, something that the had not been done for 30 years, there was little institutional knowledge concerning the procedures to develop the facility. Further, no authority was vested in the W76 project manager to control the schedule for Y-12 Fogbank production facility. Even when the issue was raised with departments authorized to address the concerns, those concerns, according the GAO, remained unresolved.
As a result, the construction project was delayed a year. Due to deadlines set by NNSA, the new time parameters left the scientists half of the two years initially planned for the Fogbank production process.
Further, the GAO found that despite the fact that "NNSA had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s, and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency," the agency failed to begin work on an alternative to Fogbank till it was too late.
"With limited resources, assumptions such as 'we did it before so we can do it again' are often wrong," the GAO report summarized.
It was not till 2007, when a major last ditch effort termed "Code Blue" failed, that it was finally decided to develop an alternative component. However, despite the added $23 million cost of development, the cheaper more efficient model was too late for acceptance by the Navy who was not assured of the new products reliability. The NNSA was forced to delay the program's first warhead production from September 2007 to September 2008 while they continued to re-learn the intricacies of Fogbank.
The GAO reported: "Had NNSA continued research and development of an alternate material during the program, it would have had more information on the viability of using the alternate material in the weapon before March 2007. This additional information also might have provided the Navy greater assurance that an alternate material performed as well as Fogbank." The replacement is currently being certified for use in case other errors occur in Fogbank during the now sped up schedule for Stockpile Extension Program.
According to the GAO, the $69 million dollar cost overrun included $22 million for the development of Fogbank, $23 million to develop an alternative to Fogbank, and $24 million to retain production capabilities of employees during the year long extension due to project setbacks. The setback also caused significant logistical problems for the Navy, which, as noted, received its first warhead in February.
The report recommends a number of changes to help enhance the management of the Stockpile Program, including creating a better accounting method to determine costs of the program, "address technical challenges while meeting all military requirements," "build in time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program," and "before beginning a life extension program, assess the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for each military requirement established by DOD."
Ostendorff explained that he "generally agrees" with the findings of the GAO report, but added, "As with many processes that implement increased rigor, there is a need for identification of increased funding in order to increase the fidelity in project risk assessment."
In commenting on the nuclear agency's future projects, including both the continued up take of the W76 program and the development of a new more efficient warhead, the GAO did explain that past project management decisions "did not inspire confidence" in its ability to achieve goals on time and on budget.
It may be too much to ask, but perhaps they should etch this gem from the studies conclusion section above their offices' door. "Refurbishing the nuclear weapons stockpile is a difficult task."
Also Interesting:
Get our Newsletter!
Click here to sign up and stay informed
